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Introduction	  
	  In	  section	  1	  of	  this	  paper,	  the	  main	  policy	  objectives	  of	  four	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  important	   central	  banks:	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  of	   the	  U.S.,	   the	  European	  Central	  Bank,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  Japan	  have	  been	  summarized.	  	  Warranting	  a	  closer	  look	  is	  not	  so	  much	  what	  these	  policy	  objectives	  are	  and	  the	  ground	  that	  they	  cover	  but,	  notwithstanding	  how	  important	  they	  may	  be,	  what	  is	  left	  out.	  	  After	   the	   financial	   crisis	   of	   2007-­‐2008,	   central	   banks	   have	   moved	   decisively	  towards	  strengthening	  the	  banking	  sector	  with	   the	  aim	  of	   improving	  the	  shock	  absorption	  capacity	  readying	  banks	  for	  any	  future	  heavy	  loan	  losses.	  ‘Too	  big	  to	  fail’	  risks	  have	  been	  addressed.	  Other	  sectors	  of	  the	  financial	  services	  arena	  like	  insurance	   companies,	   pension	   funds	   and	   asset	   management	   companies,	   have	  also	  become	  the	  subject	  of	   intense	  regulatory	  scrutiny.	  More	  needs	   to	  be	  done,	  but	  major	  steps	  have	  been	  taken.	  	  Central	   banks	   have	   also	   provided	  US$7	   trillion	   of	  monetary	   stimulus	   and	   kept	  their	   lending	  rates	  at	  near	  zero.	  The	  ECB	  and	   the	  Bank	  of	   Japan	  are	  still	   in	   the	  process	  of	  buying	  government	  and	  other	  types	  of	  debt	  paper,	  all	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  stimulating	  economic	  growth.	  As	  of	  August	  2015,	  inflation	  levels	  stood	  at	  0.2%	  in	  Japan	  and	  0.2%	  in	  the	  Euro	  Area,	  -­‐0.1%	  in	  the	  U.K.	  in	  September	  and	  -­‐0.2%	  in	  the	  U.S.	  for	  August.	  These	  levels	  are	  far	  below	  the	  target	  level	  of	  inflation,	  which	  has	  been	  set	  at	  or	  slightly	  above	  2%	  at	  on	  annual	  basis.	  	  All	  this	  has	  not	  prevented	  the	  IMF	  from	  predicting	  a	  slide	  towards	  the	  next	  global	  recession.	  A	  US$3	  trillion	  company	  debt	  burden,	  especially	  in	  emerging	  markets,	  may	  come	  to	  haunt	  the	  broader	  financial	  markets.	  	  Have	  central	  banks	  run	  out	  of	  options	  to	  stimulate	  growth?	  Are	  their	  tools	  still	  fit	  for	   purpose?	   Should	   one	   continue	   with	   yet	   more	   quantitative	   easing	   and/or	  negative	  interest	  rates?	  Or	  is	  perhaps	  the	  use	  of	  a	  ‘one-­‐size	  fits	  all’	  base	  rate	  for	  stimulating	   households,	   companies	   and	   a	   government	   no	   longer	   the	   right	  approach	  to	  managing	  an	  economy?	  Should	  the	  borrowing	  behavior	  of	  individual	  households	  be	   treated	  differently	   from	  those	  of	  companies?	  After	  all	   individual	  households	  do	  not	  operate	  on	  a	  for-­‐profit	  basis.	  	  In	   a	   paper	   by	   this	   author:	   “Collective	   Household	   Economics	   and	   the	   need	   for	  funds	   approach;	   the	   2007-­‐2008	   financial	   crisis	   and	   its	   effects”1	  it	   was	   argued	  that	  the	  demand	  for	  long	  term	  funds	  borrowed	  by	  individual	  households	  (mainly	  mortgages)	  was	  not	  based	  on	  the	  same	  parameters	  as	  the	  supply	  of	  funds	  by	  the	  banking	   sector.	   The	   demand	   (or	   need)	   for	   funds	   was	   based	   on	   population	  growth,	  changes	  in	  average	  household	  size	  and	  changes	  in	  taste	  patterns;	  all	  non-­‐financial	  matters.	  It	  was	  also	  based	  on	  affordability	  levels	  to	  service	  mortgage	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  https://mpra.ub.uni-­‐muenchen.de/66851/1/MPRA_paper_66851.pdf	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  debt	   out	   of	   incomes.	   The	   paper	   concludes	   that	   households	   need	   a	   ‘dynamic	  stability’	   in	   their	   long-­‐term	   debt	   obligations.	   This	   could	   be	   achieved	   with	   the	  help	   of	   different	   central	   bank	   tools	   strictly	   for	   the	   benefit	   of	   individual	  households.	   Such	   tools	   could	   include	   a	   volume	   mortgage	   lending	   control	  mechanism:	  a	  traffic	  light	  system	  directed	  to	  the	  lenders	  side.	  Another	  tool	  could	  be	  a	  dual	  price	   setting	  mechanism	   for	  households’	   long-­‐term	  debt.	  Households	  would	   pay	   for	   the	   debt	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   CPI	   level	   plus	   a	  margin,	   while	   lenders	  would	  receive	  costs	  of	  funds	  plus	  their	  margin.	  Of	  course,	  as	  the	  paper	  showed,	  differences	  between	  these	  rates	  will	  occur,	  the	  fix	  for	  which	  could	  be	  to	  use	  funds	  backed	  by	  the	  Treasury	  in	  some	  years	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap.	  In	  other	  years,	  Treasury	  will	   benefit	   from	   such	   differences.	   Finally,	   enhanced	   quality	   control	   measures	  will	  mean	  that	  mortgages	  are	  long-­‐term	  borrowings	  with	  full	  repayments.	  	  Creating	  such	  an	  environment	  will	  allow	  central	  banks	  to	  move	  their	  base	  rates	  more	   freely	   and	   in	   line	   with	   the	   level	   of	   corporate	   activities.	   The	   notion	   that	  households,	  companies	  and	  a	  government	  all	  need	  the	  same	  base	  rate	  level	  has	  proven	   to	   be	   unworkable.	   The	  more	   stable	   the	   financial	   position	   of	   individual	  households,	  the	  better	  the	  growth	  prospects	  for	  the	  whole	  economy.	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2	  Objectives	  of	  central	  banks	  	  	  The	  objectives	  of	  the	  four	  main	  central	  banks	  in	  the	  world:	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  for	  the	  Eurozone	  countries,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  for	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  Japan	  for	  Japan,	  have	  much	  in	  common	  but	  do	  differ	  with	  small	  variations.	  	  What	  are	  the	  Federal	  Reserve's	  objectives2	  in	  conducting	  monetary	  policy?	  	  Congress	   established	   the	   statutory	   objectives	   for	   monetary	   policy-­‐-­‐maximum	  employment,	  stable	  prices,	  and	  moderate	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates-­‐-­‐in	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Act.	  The	  Federal	  Open	  Market	  Committee	  (FOMC)	  is	  firmly	  committed	  to	  fulfilling	  this	  statutory	  mandate.	  In	  pursuing	  these	  objectives,	  the	  FOMC	  seeks	  to	  explain	  its	  monetary	  policy	  decisions	  to	  the	  public	  as	  clearly	  as	  possible.	  Clarity	  in	   policy	   communications	   facilitates	   well-­‐informed	   decision	   making	   by	  households	   and	   businesses,	   reduces	   economic	   and	   financial	   uncertainty,	  increases	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  monetary	  policy,	  and	  enhances	   transparency	  and	  accountability,	  which	  are	  essential	  in	  a	  democratic	  society.	  Following	  its	  meeting	  in	  January	  2012,	  the	  FOMC	  issued	  a	  statement	  regarding	  its	  longer-­‐run	  goals	  and	  monetary	  policy	  strategy.	  The	  FOMC	  noted	   in	   its	  statement	  that	   the	  Committee	  judges	  that	  inflation	  at	  the	  rate	  of	  2	  percent	  (as	  measured	  by	  the	  annual	  change	  in	   the	   price	   index	   for	   personal	   consumption	   expenditures,	   or	   PCE)	   is	   most	  consistent	   over	   the	   longer	   run	   with	   the	   Federal	   Reserve's	   statutory	   mandate.	  Communicating	   this	   inflation	   goal	   clearly	   helps	   keep	   longer-­‐term	   inflation	  expectations	   firmly	   anchored,	   thereby	   fostering	   price	   stability	   and	   moderate	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  and	  enhancing	  the	  FOMC's	  ability	  to	  promote	  maximum	  employment.	   The	   maximum	   level	   of	   employment	   is	   largely	   determined	   by	  nonmonetary	   factors	   that	   affect	   the	   structure	   and	  dynamics	   of	   the	   job	  market.	  These	   factors	  may	   change	  over	   time	  and	  may	  not	  be	  directly	  measurable.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  FOMC	  does	  not	  specify	  a	  fixed	  goal	  for	  maximum	  employment;	  rather,	  the	  FOMC's	  policy	  decisions	  must	  be	   informed	  by	   its	  members'	   assessments	  of	  the	   maximum	   level	   of	   employment,	   though	   such	   assessments	   are	   necessarily	  uncertain	   and	   subject	   to	   revision.	  In	   the	   FOMC’s	   September	   2015	   Summary	   of	  Economic	   Projections,	   Committee	   participants’	   estimates	   of	   the	   longer-­‐run	  normal	  rate	  of	  unemployment	  ranged	  from	  4.7	  to	  5.8	  percent	  and	  had	  a	  median	  value	  of	  4.9	  percent.	  In	  setting	  monetary	  policy,	  the	  Committee	  seeks	  to	  mitigate	  deviations	   of	   inflation	   from	   its	   longer-­‐run	   goal	   and	   deviations	   of	   employment	  from	   the	   Committee's	   assessments	   of	   its	  maximum	   level.	   These	   objectives	   are	  generally	  complementary.	  However,	  under	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12848.htm	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  circumstances	   in	   which	   the	   Committee	   judges	   that	   the	   objectives	   are	   not	  complementary,	   it	   follows	  a	  balanced	  approach	   in	  promoting	   them,	   taking	   into	  account	   the	   magnitude	   of	   the	   deviations	   and	   the	   potentially	   different	   time	  horizons	  over	  which	  employment	  and	  inflation	  are	  projected	  to	  return	  to	  levels	  judged	  consistent	  with	  its	  mandate.	  	  For	   the	   ECB 3 	  to	   maintain	   price	   stability	   is	   the	   primary	   objective	   of	   the	  Eurosystem	  and	  of	  the	  single	  monetary	  policy	  for	  which	  it	  is	  responsible.	  This	  is	  laid	  down	   in	   the	  Treaty	  on	   the	  Functioning	  of	   the	  European	  Union,	  Article	  127	  (1). "Without	  prejudice	  to	  the	  objective	  of	  price	  stability",	  the	  Eurosystem	  shall	  also	  "support	  the	  general	  economic	  policies	  in	  the	  Union	  with	  a	  view	  to	  contributing	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Union".	  These	  include	  inter	  alia	  "full	  employment"	  and	  "balanced	  economic	  growth".	  	  The	  Bank	  of	  England4	  also	  has	  price	  stability	  as	  a	  main	  priority,	  but	  apart	   from	  that	   it	   also	   aims	   at	   financial	   stability.	   This	   is	   defined	   as	   public	   trust	   and	  confidence	  in	  financial	  institutions,	  markets,	  infrastructure,	  and	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  that	  is	  critical	  to	  a	  healthy,	  well-­‐functioning	  economy.	  	  	  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  plays	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  maintaining	  financial	  stability	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways:	  	  	  
• Reinforcing	  trust	  and	  confidence	  in	  money	  itself;	  
• Acting	   as	   lender	   and	   market	   maker	   of	   last	   resort	   at	   times	   of	   financial	  stress;	  	  
• Promoting	   the	   safety	   and	   soundness	   of	   individual	   financial	   institutions	  (via	  the	  Prudential	  Regulation	  Authority);	  	  
• Removing	   or	   reducing	   risks	   to	   the	   financial	   system	   as	   a	   whole,	   via	   the	  Financial	  Policy	  Committee;	  	  
• Supervising	  financial	  market	  infrastructure;	  	  
• Safely	  resolving	  failing	  financial	  institutions;	  	  
• Collaborating	  with	  other	  UK	  financial	  authorities	  to	  support	  UK	  financial	  sector	  business	  continuity	  and	  operational	  resilience.	  	  The	  Bank	  of	  Japan5	  has	  multiple	  objectives:	  price	  stability	  and	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  financial	  system.	  Price	  stability	  objective	  is	  set	  in	  qualitative	  terms	  in	  the	  1998	  law	  and	  the	  policy	  board	  has	  quantified	  this	  as	  a	  range	  of	  0%	  to	  2%	  inflation	  in	  the	  medium	  term.	  It	  has	  a	  two	  perspectives	  strategy,	  the	  first	  focusing	  on	  short-­‐term	  inflation	  developments	  and	  the	  second	  on	  economic	  and	  inflation	  developments	  as	  well	  as	  financial	  stability	  in	  a	  longer-­‐term	  perspective.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/objective/html/index.en.html	  4	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Pages/default.aspx	  5	  http://www.boj.or.jp/en/about/activities/act/data/ar0506.pdf	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2	  Central	  bank	  tools	  
	  In	  a	  fascinating	  article	  by	  Reuters6:	  “From	  heroes	  to	  bystanders?	  Central	  banks’	  growth	   challenge”	   the	   authors	   point	   out	   that	   “despite	   near-­‐zero	   rates	   and	   $7	  trillion	   of	   monetary	   stimulus	   unleashed	   by	   central	   banks	   in	   major	   industrial	  economies,	   investment	   and	   growth	   is	   stuck	   below	   pre-­‐crisis	   levels	   and	   tepid	  demand	   is	   hurting	   developing	   economies	   by	   depressing	   prices	   of	   their	  commodity	  exports.”	  	  Perhaps	   rather	   than	  admitting	  defeat	   in	  accepting	   that	   the	   tools	  used	  have	  not	  had	   the	   impact	   expected,	   it	   is	   prudent	   to	   examine	   why	   these	   tools	   have	   not	  worked	  well	  so	  far.	  	  In	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  paper,	  “Collective	  Household	  Economics	  and	  the	  needs	  for	   funds	   approach”,	   not	   only	   were	   the	   root	   causes	   of	   the	   2007-­‐2008	   U.S.	  financial	  crisis	  analyzed,	  but	  also	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  crisis	  on	  household	  finances	  after	  2008	  to	  to-­‐day’s	  situation.	  	  Over	   the	   period	   between	   2006-­‐2013,	   21.3	  million	   households	   in	   the	  U.S.	  were	  confronted	   with	   foreclosure	   proceedings.	   This	   compares	   to	   the	   47.5	   million	  households	  who	   had	   a	  mortgage,	   affecting	   nearly	   45%	  of	   all	  mortgagors.	   Over	  the	   same	  period	  5.8	  million	  homes	  were	   repossessed.	  This	   represents	  1	  out	  of	  every	  8	  households	  with	  a	  mortgage.	  	  As	   a	   consequence	  of	   the	  pressures	  by	   the	  banking	   sector	   to	   repay	  outstanding	  mortgage	   loans,	   outstanding	   mortgage	   debt	   levels	   were	   reduced	   by	   US$1.2	  trillion	  over	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2014	  or	  by	  about	  12%	  from	  their	  peak	  level.	  	  During	   the	  period	  2009-­‐2011,	  new	  home	  construction	   levels	  dropped	   to	  about	  one	  third	  (600,000	  new	  homes)	  of	  the	  1.8	  million	  new	  homes	  required	  annually	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  population	  growth	  and	  changes	  in	  family	  size.	  In	  2015,	  the	  new	  home	  starts	  are	  still	  running	  at	  about	  a	   third	  below	  the	  1.8	  million	  new	  homes	  required.	  Home	  ownership	  levels	  have	  dropped	  from	  69.2%	  of	  all	  households	  in	  June	  2004	  to	  63.7%	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2015.	  First	  time	  buyers	  now	  only	  make	  up	  29%	  of	  homebuyers	  compared	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  average	  of	  40%.	  	  Added	   to	   this,	   the	   U.S.	   government	   debt	   level	   nearly	   doubled	   over	   the	   period	  2007-­‐2014	  from	  US$9	  trillion	  to	  US$17.8	  trillion	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2014.	  	  Why	   are	   these	   facts	   relevant	   to	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   policy	   tools	   used	   by	   central	  banks?	  	  In	  answering	  the	  question,	  it	  is	  instructive	  to	  consider	  what	  are	  some	  of	  the	   guiding	   principles	   behind	   individual	   households	   borrowing	   in	   order	   to	  secure	  a	  property.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/01/us-­‐global-­‐centralbanks-­‐idUSKCN0RV3G020151001	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  The	   first	  principle	   is	   that	  households	  do	  not	  buy	  homes	  because	   interest	   rates	  are	  low	  or	  high,	  but	  because	  they	  need	  a	  place	  to	  live.	  If	  given	  a	  choice	  between	  renting	  or	  home	  ownership,	  nearly	  all	  households	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  U.K.,	  Japan	  and	  many	   countries	   in	   the	  EU	  would	  prefer	   to	   own	   their	   home.	   For	  many	   low	  and	  median	  income	  families,	  it	  means	  that	  a	  mortgage	  is	  a	  necessary	  evil	  to	  be	  able	  to	  buy	  a	  home.	  	  The	   second	   principle	   is	   that	   the	   “need	   for	   a	   place	   to	   live”	   has	   been	   over-­‐	  shadowed	   by	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   mortgage	   funding	   mechanisms	   currently	   in	  place,	   including	   the	   setting	   of	   base	   rates.	   The	   overfunding	   of	   the	   U.S.	   housing	  market	  over	  the	  period	  1998-­‐2005	  was	  not	  stopped,	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  market	  was	  not	  challenged	  and	  the	   legal	  system	  did	  not	  help	  either	  as	  borrowers	  were	  (and	  still	  are)	  typically	  regarded	  as	  the	  ones	  who	  made	  the	  misjudgments.	  	  The	   third	   conclusion	   is	   that	   since	   2007,	   individual	   households	   have	   been	  unwilling	  to	  increase	  their	  collective	  mortgage	  levels	  when	  following	  a	  period	  of	  significant	  pressure	  being	  put	  on	  them	  to	  repay	  outstanding	  mortgage	  loans.	  The	  lowest	   interest	   rates	   on	   record	   did	   not	   spur	   them	  on;	   neither	   did	   quantitative	  easing	  as	   the	   latter	  was	   focused	  on	  households	  and	  on	   institutions	   that	  owned	  bonds	   on	   behalf	   of	   households.	   The	   richer	   classes	   and	   indirectly	   overseas	  companies	   benefitted	   from	   such	   easing,	   but	   the	   direct	   economic	   benefits	   to	  households	  on	  median	  and	  lower	  income	  levels,	  if	  any,	  were	  very	  limited.	  	  The	  overriding	  conclusion	  is	  that	  in	  most	  circumstances,	  an	  increased	  volume	  of	  money	  in	  circulation	  does	  not	  create	  economic	  growth	  and	  neither	  does	  lowering	  the	  price	  of	  money	  (interest	  rate),	  nor	  through	  increasing	  the	  volume	  of	  lending.	  	  	  A	   second	  article	  by	  Reuters7:	   “The	  central	  bank	  cavalry	  can	  no	   longer	   save	   the	  world”	  The	  article	  quotes	   the	  Group	  of	  Thirty,	  under	  the	  chairmanship	  of	   Jean-­‐	  Claude	   Trichet,	   a	   former	  Governor	   of	   the	   Banque	   de	   France,	  who	  warned	   that	  zero	  rates	  and	  money	  printing	  were	  not	  sufficient	  to	  revive	  economic	  growth	  and	  risked	  becoming	  permanent	  features.	  	  
	  
3	  Some	  policy	  objectives	  
	  
3.1.The	  inflation	  objective	  
	  The	  objective	  to	  keep	  the	  consumer	  price	  inflation	  level	  at	  around	  2%	  per	  annum	  has	  been	  enshrined	   in	  all	   four	  mentioned	  central	  banks’	  policies.	  However,	   the	  question	  should	  be	  raised:	  “Who	  is	  protected	  by	  this	  target”?	  Is	  it	  the	  household	  sector	   and	   if	   not,	   do	   companies	   or	   a	   government	   need	   this	   protection?	   	   It	   is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  former	  and	  the	  latter	  will	  benefit	  equally	  from	  the	  objective.	  It	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/central-­‐bank-­‐cavalry-­‐no-­‐longer-­‐025916460.html	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  not	  enough	  just	  to	  state	  that	  acting	  upon	  an	  inflation	  objective	  protects	  the	  value	  of	   a	   currency;	   is	   it	   the	   currency	   as	   in	   household	   incomes	   or	   in	   sales	   or	   home	  prices?	  	  The	   question	   raised	   is	   essential	   in	   the	   context	   of	   this	   paper.	   If	   the	   economic	  world	  was	   comprised	  of	   cash	  and	  cash	   transactions	  only,	   then	  currency	  values	  would	  be	  of	  vital	  importance.	  However,	  the	  world	  did	  get	  a	  lot	  more	  complicated	  when	   loans	   were	   introduced,	   especially	   of	   the	   long-­‐term	   borrowing	   type.	   By	  their	   nature,	   long-­‐term	   borrowings	   stretch	   out	   over	   many	   years	   in	   which	  inflation	  levels	  may	  vary	  substantially.	  Long-­‐term	  borrowers	  are	  exposed	  to	  two	  types	  of	  risks:	  interest	  rate	  risk	  and	  income	  risk.	  	  The	  focus	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  on	  the	  collective	  of	   individual	  households.	  Take	  as	  an	  example	   a	   U.S.	  mortgage	   borrower,	  who	   took	   out	   a	   30-­‐year	   loan	   from	   Freddy	  Mac	   in	   1997	  with	   a	   rate	   of	   7.6%	   fixed	   over	   30	   years.	   In	   2014,	   the	   same	   loan	  would	   still	   have	   had	   a	   7.6%	   interest	   rate.	   The	   outstanding	   mortgage	   debt	   as	  expressed	  in	  U.S.	  dollar	  values	  of	  1997	  would	  have	  increased	  substantially	  as	  in	  the	  years	  2009-­‐2014	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  2011	  when	  the	  CPI	   level	   increased	  	  above	  the	  2.3%	  CPI	  change	  of	  1997).	  What	  this	  all	  means	  is	  that	  inflation	  has	  not	  just	  got	  a	  short-­‐term	  effect,	  but	  for	  mortgage	  borrowers	  also	  a	  long	  term	  impact.	  Acting	  to	  counteract	  short-­‐term	  CPI	  variations	  seems	  to	  help	  little	  in	  overcoming	  the	  long-­‐term	  impact	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  values	  of	  borrowed	  currency.	  	  Another	  effect	  of	   the	   financial	  crisis	  was	  on	  the	  nominal	   income	  developments.	  From	  2008	   to	   2012,	  U.S.	   nominal	  median	  household	   incomes	   initially	   dropped	  and	   subsequently	   slightly	   recovered	   to	   the	   2008	   level.	   To	   pay	   debts	   back	   in	   a	  situation	  where	  the	  CPI	  index	  still	  moves	  up,	  but	  incomes	  growth	  is	  non-­‐existent,	  will	  certainly	  hamper	  economic	  growth.	  Again,	  the	  value	  of	  a	  currency	  is	  not	  just	  a	  cost	  price	  inflation	  matter,	  but	  also	  a	  debt	  matter	  in	  relation	  to	  income	  growth	  levels.	  	  The	   conclusion	  out	   of	   the	   above	   is	   that	   a	   borrowing	   system	  has	   to	  be	   created,	  which	  is	  much	  more	  aligned	  with	  changes	  in	  nominal	  income	  levels	  rather	  than	  base	  rate	  changes.	  Price	  stability	  may	  be	  one	  objective	   for	  central	  banks,	  but	   it	  should	  be	   twinned	  with	  maintenance	  of	  a	   “dynamic	   stability”	  –	   stability	  over	  a	  longer	  period	  of	  time-­‐	  for	  servicing	  long-­‐term	  loans	  out	  of	  nominal	  incomes.	  	  	  
3.2	  The	  full	  employment	  objective	  
	  One	   lesson	   learned	   from	   the	   financial	   crisis	  2007-­‐2008	  was	   that	   the	   real	   crisis	  had	  already	  started	  in	  2002.	  Mortgage	  lending	  levels	  nearly	  quadrupled	  between	  1997	   and	   2002;	   during	   the	   same	   period,	   the	   annual	   new	   housing	   starts	   only	  increased	   by	   15.7%.	   Substantial	   amounts	   of	   borrowed	   funds	   were	   diverted	  thereby	   increasing	   existing	   house	   prices.	   A	   dollar	   saved	   in	   1997	   and	   used	   in	  2002	  would	  only	  buy	  a	  smaller	  share	  of	  a	  standard	  home,	  than	  if	  the	  dollar	  had	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  been	   used	   in	   1997.	   This	   dollar	   depreciation	   in	   value	   in	   house	   price	   terms	  continued	   unabatedly	   to	   2007.	   The	   result	   was	   not	   only	   extreme	   pressure	   on	  households	  to	  repay	  the	  outstanding	  loans,	  as	  indicated	  above,	  but	  also	  a	  general	  recession	   with	   accompanying	   acutely	   high	   levels	   of	   unemployment.	   The	  overfunding	   period	   of	   home	   mortgages	   between	   1997	   and	   2007	   was	   directly	  responsible	   for	   the	   subsequent	   increase	   in	   unemployment	   levels	   in	   2008	   and	  especially	  2009.	  Household	  incomes	  came	  under	  strong	  pressure	  both	  from	  the	  financial	   side	  obligations	  and	   from	   the	   income	  side.	  No	  wonder	   that	   the	  2007-­‐2008	  financial	  crisis	  was	  the	  worst	  economic	  crisis	  since	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  	  Both	   in	   the	   U.S.	   and	   in	   the	   U.K.,	   unemployment	   rates	   have	   dropped	   to	   pre-­‐recession	  levels.	  The	  Eurozone	  countries	  are	  still	  a	  long	  way	  behind.	  In	  Japan	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  has	  returned	  to	  1997	  levels.	  
	  The	  lesson	  learned	  is	  not	  a	  new	  one:	  that	  prevention	  of	  the	  excess	  lending	  levels	  would	   have	   been	  much	   better	   than	   the	   cure	   to	   their	   effects.	   Employment	   and	  income	  levels	  would	  have	  been	  much	  better	  off.	  Government	  debt	   levels	  would	  have	  been	  substantially	  lower.	  	  
	  
3.3	  The	  financial	  stability	  objective	  
	  Central	   banks	   first	   and	   foremost	   concentrate	   their	   efforts	   on	   maintaining	   the	  financial	   stability	   of	   the	   financial	   sector.	   This	   is	   understandable,	   but	   also	  somewhat	   shortsighted.	   Of	   course,	   the	   banking	   and	   other	   financial	   sector	  elements	   need	   to	   be	   kept	   on	   a	   sound	   footing	   but	   bailing	   out	   of	   banks	   by	  governments	   should	   be	   avoided.	   	   While	   wider	   economic	   goals,	   like	   full	  employment	  and	  CPI	   inflation	  management	  are	   increasingly	   taken	   into	  account	  by	  central	  bank	  policy,	   it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  financial	  stability	  position	  of	  individual	   households	   is	   somewhat	   of	   a	   neglected	   area.	   Would	   central	   bank	  action	   in	   this	   space	   not	   help	   to	   achieve	   other	   objectives	   of	   prime	   economic	  importance,	   such	   as	   improving	   the	   stability	   of	   an	   economy	   and	   thereby	   of	   the	  banking	  sector	  as	  well?	  There	   is	  certainly	  room	  in	  the	  central	  bank	  policy	  shed	  for	  some	  tools	  to	  better	  accommodate	  the	  collective	  of	  individual	  households.	  
	  	  
4	  Change	  some	  tools	  
	  
4.1	  The	  interest	  rate	  tool	  
	  On	  16th	  December	  2008,	  the	  Fed	  funds	  rate	  was	  lowered	  to	  the	  0-­‐0.25%	  range.	  This	   rate	   has	   been	   kept	   for	   nearly	   seven	   years	   without	   any	   change.	   The	  weakness	  of	   the	   interest	  rate	  tool	   is	   that	  all	  users	  of	   funds	  are	  confronted	  with	  the	   same	   rate,	   while	   the	   need	   for	   funds	   differs	   widely	   from	   individual	  households	  to	  companies	  and	  to	  governments,	  not	  to	  mention	  countries	  other	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  than	   the	   U.S.	   where	   U.S.	   dollar	   borrowings	   and	   savings	   have	   become	  commonplace.	  	  In	  the	  Collective	  Households	  Economics	  paper	  quoted	  before,	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  the	   supply	   of	   home	   mortgage	   funds	   does	   not	   necessarily	   reflect	   the	   need	   for	  funds	   as	   the	   latter	   are	   based	   on	   population	   growth	   levels,	   changes	   in	   average	  household	   size	   and	   changes	   in	   style	   of	   housing	   preferences.	   The	   divergence	  between	   the	   supply	  of	  mortgage	   funds	   and	   the	  need	   for	   funds	  over	   the	  period	  1998-­‐2007	   led	   to	   the	   subsequent	   mortgage	   crisis	   and	   its	   dire	   consequences	  during	  later	  years.	  	  Why	  do	  central	  banks	  fail	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  despite	  all	  users	  of	  money	  being	  subjected	  to	  the	  same	  base	  price,	  households,	  companies	  and	  governments	  have	  very	   different	   income	   generating	  motives?	  Households	   generally	   have	   to	  work	  for	  an	  income	  and	  are	  not	  motivated	  by	  profit	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  corporations	  are.	  	  The	   Fed	   funds	   rate	   is	   a	   supply	   of	  money	   tool,	   rather	   than	   a	   tool	   for	   adjusting	  different	   levels	   of	   demand	   generated	   by	   different	   groups	   in	   a	   society.	   The	   Fed	  funds	  rate	  works	  its	  way	  into	  the	  supply	  side	  of	  money	  through	  altering	  the	  price	  for	  lending,	  including	  mortgage	  costs.	  	  The	  proposal	  put	  forward	  by	  this	  author	  in	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  paper	  is	  to	  split	  the	   money	   pricing	   mechanism	   for	   long-­‐term	   borrowings	   by	   individual	  households,	   thereby	   creating	   a	   dual	   interest	   rate	   system	   (with	   one	   pricing	  mechanism	   for	   the	   lending	   banks	   and	   one	   for	   the	   individual	   household	  borrowers).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  such	  a	  system	  accommodates	  the	  fact	  that	  incomes	  and	   income	   growth	   are	   the	   sole	   determinants	   for	   the	   ability	   of	   individual	  households	  to	  repay	  outstanding	   long-­‐term	  loans	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	   it	  also	  addresses	  the	  point	  that	  banks	  are	  unable	  to	  vary	  their	  lending	  rates	  in	  line	  with	  income	  growth	  levels	  of	  their	  clients.	  The	  dual	  system	  would	  involve	  individual	  households	  paying	  for	  their	  mortgage	  loans	  on	  a	  CPI	  plus	  margin	  basis.	  Economic	  history	   shows	   a	   positive	   correlation	   between	   nominal	   income	   growth	   and	   CPI	  changes.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  banks	  can	  base	  their	  price	  setting	  on	  costs	  of	  funds,	  including	  the	  central	  bank’s	  base	  rates	  plus	  their	  margin.	  	  The	  interest	  tool	  can	  be	  made	  even	  more	  flexible.	  In	  2009,	  nominal	  income	  levels	  dropped.	   At	   such	   times,	   it	   may	   be	   opportune	   to	   use	   a	   variant	   of	   quantitative	  easing:	   the	  margin	   over	   the	   CPI	   index	   could	   be	   temporarily	   reduced,	   so	   as	   to	  enable	  households	   to	   continue	   to	   consume	  other	  goods	  and	  services,	   therefore	  maintaining	  employment	  and	  economic	  growth	  levels.	  	  Naturally,	  differences	  will	  occur	  over	  time	  between	  the	  borrowing	  costs	  paid	  by	  individual	   households	   and	   the	   cost	   of	   money	   received	   by	   the	   banks	   for	   such	  loans.	  In	  case	  of	  temporary	  deficits,	  central	  banks	  can	  advance	  such	  funds	  to	  the	  banking	  sector;	  in	  case	  of	  surpluses	  when	  individual	  households	  pay	  more	  that	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  what	   banks	   should	   receive	   the	   surplus	   returns	   to	   the	   central	   bank.	   These	  balancing	   settlements	   can	   come	   with	   a	   government	   guarantee	   to	   the	   central	  bank	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  monetary	  policy.	  	  Introducing	   a	   dual	   pricing	   system	   for	   long-­‐term	   borrowings	   by	   the	   individual	  household	  sector	  will	  provide	  greater	  freedom	  for	  central	  banks	  to	  set	  their	  base	  rates	  in	  a	  way	  designed	  to	  improve	  or	  slow	  down	  the	  business	  sector.	  	  For	  the	  Eurozone	  countries,	  it	  will	  mean	  that	  the	  national	  central	  banks	  will	  have	  the	   responsibility	   for	   long-­‐term	  mortgage	   borrowings	   by	   their	   own	   citizens	   as	  each	   country	   has	   different	   levels	   of	   population	   growth,	   different	   levels	   of	  mortgage	  lending	  etc.	  Settling	  the	  differences	  between	  what	  households	  pay	  and	  what	   banks	   receive	   will	   also	   be	   a	   national	   issue.	   The	   ECB	   would	   remain	  responsible	   for	   interest	   rate	   setting	   for	   the	   business	   sector	   throughout	   the	  Eurozone	  countries.	  	  	  	  	  
4.2	  The	  volume-­‐lending	  tool	  
	  In	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   paper,	   a	   “traffic	   light	   system”	   was	   proposed	   to	   help	  better	  manage	   the	   volume	  growth	   in	  home	  mortgage	   lending.	   In	   the	  Eurozone	  this	  would	   again	   be	  managed	   and	   administered	   by	   the	   national	   central	   banks.	  Again	  this	  volume	  lending	  tool	  would	  only	  be	  applicable	  to	  home	  mortgage	  loans.	  	  
	  
	  
4.3	  Product	  quality	  controls	  




5	  Some	  conclusions	  
	  
• The	  effectiveness	  of	  central	  banks	  in	  controlling	  inflation	  and	  in	  financial	  stability	  management	  has	  been	  weakened	  by	  base	  rates	  that	  are	  at	   their	  lowest	  levels	  ever	  and	  simply	  adding	  more	  money	  into	  circulation	  has	  not	  had	  the	  desired	  effects.	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  the	  continuing	  malaise	  is	  that	  the	   income	  stability	  of	   individual	  household,	  especially	  of	   the	   lower	  and	  median	  income	  levels	  has	  not	  received	  the	  attention	  it	  deserves.	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